President Mohammad Ashraf Ghani's latest interview with BBC - AFG SMART BLOG

President Mohammad Ashraf Ghani's latest interview with BBC

 (Interviewed on behalf of the BBC by General Nick Carter, Chief of Staff of the United Kingdom)

 

 General Carter: Mr. President, I'm glad to have the opportunity to interview you.  Three days have passed since the fall of Kabul and the rise of the Taliban.  You and I talked a lot in the days before the fall.  It was hard not to talk to you after the fall and now is a good time to talk about what happened after more than 3 days.  I think the first thing I want to assess in this interview is that we were all shocked by the Taliban's rapid rise to power in August this year.  That is why we left the country so quickly.  I think this would be a good idea to start our conversation by asking why you left the country.  I would like to clarify this so that we know what happened on that weekend [August 2 and 3]?

 President Ghani: Thank you, General.  Nice to meet you and interview you.  In fact, we are both actors in the [Afghanistan issue].  I would like to thank you, the Government of the United Kingdom and the people of the United Kingdom for their support and cooperation over the past 20 years, especially for your role as Deputy Commander of ISAF and in other capacities.  .  I come directly to the answer to your question.

 The first reason I left was to prevent the destruction of Kabul.  During the Mujahideen's infighting for power, Kabul was once destroyed and turned into a battlefield.  As two different Taliban factions approached Kabul from two different directions, there was a strong possibility of a full-scale war between them, which resulted in the destruction of the five million city of Kabul and the loss of lives.  .  My position was clear, I did not want to be the second Assad [Bashar al-Assad].

 2nd  By staying I was legitimizing a bloody coup.  It was a coup, not a political coup.  The Taliban violated all their agreements and statements [and forcibly entered Kabul].

 3rd  I did not want to legitimize a coup, but to pave the way for a fundamental political settlement in the future.  Taliban rule in Afghanistan has not brought peace and national unity.  What we need is real peace and national unity.

 And the final reason;  I did not want Pakistan's ISI to fulfill its aspiration and humiliate the republic and force me to make a statement.  Or even worse, to start an interrogation of an Afghan president.  It all really changed with my stay.

 But the main reason I left the country was that our security forces had collapsed, all the [security] ministers and national security advisers came and informed me that their forces were disbanded and could not defend Kabul.  I would also like to answer your question as to why such a situation has arisen and caused it.

 General Carter: Thank you. Certainly that day, Sunday was a wonderful day.  I mean, what do you have in mind for that day, what happened that day?

 President Ghani: The events of that day are important.  The night before (August 7), Mr. Stein (US Defense Secretary) informed me that the designated "US forces" were to arrive at Kabul Airport to provide security.  "They are not assigned to defend Kabul, I repeat, they are not assigned to defend Kabul," he said.  In the morning, Defense Minister Bismillah Khan contacted me, saying that the Taliban were co-ordinating and there was no air support.  Also, the New York Federal Treasury closed our savings on Thursday or Friday (August 7 or 8).  We had about nine billion dollars in reserves, five billion of which were there.  The usual thing was that 5 million came to us every month.  The process was halted and Secretary of State Blankenship said the transfer was halted because they feared the money would not reach the Taliban.

 I was told in Karate that the Taliban did not want to side with me, you played an active role and you knew that my emphasis was on finding a dignified way for Afghans to participate in the process.  The emphasis was on the Loya Jirga.  It was a combination internationally.

 At the national level, a group of individuals like President Karzai, Dr. Abdullah and others came and said that they should be appointed as a competent delegation to negotiate with the Taliban. I also gave them this authority.

 With these two, security and political measures, the republic as an institution collapsed.  I did not have the legal authority to legitimize such a collapse of the republic, there was no legal mechanism to transfer power to anyone other than First Deputy Prime Minister Amrullah Saleh.  But not only was I unacceptable to them, but also the vice president (Saleh) was unacceptable.

 In such an atmosphere, on the morning of that day, I had no idea that this afternoon I would be forced to leave the country.  We have been informed not by international players, NATO and the United States, but by Mr. Rahimi that the Haqqani network has promised not to enter Kabul.  But two hours later the story changed.  Earlier in the day, a UAE envoy arrived to help the Taliban reach a political settlement.

 I was asked to leave Afghanistan, as well as a number of colleagues, including my National Security Adviser.  My wife, who had no intention of leaving, was asked to leave, and they left.  I was waiting for an hour and a half ago when I got in touch with Bismillah Khan and informed him of the fall.  I was on my way to the Ministry of Defense, waiting 5 minutes.  The car did not come back.  Then came National Security Adviser Dr Mohib and PPS chief Mr Kochi, who said the PPS had collapsed.  If I stand my ground, we will all die.

 They were not able to defend me, Dr. Mohib was very scared.  They didn't even have two minutes.  My instruction was to get ready to go to Khost.  Dr. Mohib told me that Khost and Jalalabad have also fallen.

 I didn't know where to go.  When we moved, it became clear that we were leaving the country.  In such a situation I had no preparation, not even the opportunity to contact you (if I could contact you, you would be close to me in international friends).  The only thing I talked to you about, if you remember, was that if there was a political agreement and the Taliban wanted me to leave Afghanistan, I wanted to go to a place that was neutral.  That way I can serve and come back.  It was all really unexpected.

 General Carter: One idea is that if you had stayed where you were and were safe in the palace, the vacuum that has now been created would have been avoided.  Do you think so?  Did anything like that come to your mind then?

 President Ghani: This gap could not be filled for the following reasons.  Yesterday you saw that through the BBC, a whistleblower revealed the British evacuation program.  The evacuation of 3 people was mentioned there.  All NATO member states had decided on a policy of imagination and implemented it.

 

 General Carter: To be fair, no one implemented the evacuation plan, think about what people noticed ...

 

 President Ghani: No, that's not true.  The evacuation plan was implemented.  All counter-terrorism units were offered withdrawal in Khost, Jalalabad, Kandahar and Kabul.  Promises were made to our generals.  The staff of the National Security Agency, a vital foundation, was imagined / fired.  Thus a psychological environment (hunger on the verge of emergence).  The army was relatively reformed, but only relatively reformed.  Only Vice President Amrullah Saleh chaired the meeting at 6:30 a.m. every day for a year, which resulted in better conditions and some order and law and order in Kabul.  The Taliban had entered the cities, your information says so.  Who would I have worked with?  Only with PPS forces?  They also changed their uniforms and put on local clothes and disappeared.  Looking to the past is very important, from my point of view the other side was this: would I have come under the pressure of arms and given legitimacy to a violent illegal occupation?

 General Carter: Mr. President, what is most extraordinary is that you told the Afghan Parliament in early August, you can do it all right.  You can save Kabul, I even remember writing an article in the London Times in early March in which I mentioned that we should support the Afghan government.  It was quite possible.  If the key provincial capitals were in the hands of the Afghan government, we would still be able to find a political solution to all these conflicts.  It is questionable how quickly everything happened in the first week of August and then in the middle of August?

 

 President Ghani: Of course, there are a number of issues that need to be addressed.

 First  Is our logistical commitment.  Our supply chain and Afghanistan's security procurement contracts were tied to the United States.  The process of imagining America was completed by July 1 (military part).  The focus was on the forces.  But the main issue was contracts; there are different estimates of the number of contractors, I would like to mention 2 to 5.  Our entire supply chain was under severe pressure.

 2nd  Afghan forces, in particular, have relied on air support since the formation of the ANA.  When faced with multiple strategic threats, they could not operate on a tactical level.  For example, for transparency, I must say that the police did not receive their salaries for six months.

 There were military bases supplied by air.  The imaginary chain of command of American forces has had an effect, Mr. General, most importantly, to make you understand militarily that strategic areas have not been considered by our international allies.  Strategic areas for Afghans are districts and provinces, and their fall has a chain effect among Afghans.

 In the eyes of our international partners, these areas were normal and did not have a chain effect.  Thus if we wanted to defend Kandahar and Kabul which were strategic areas, because the defense of the south was important, the security of the eastern regions was tight, both Nangarhar and Paktia were safe.  Our weakness was the lack of forces, as the commandos were tactically dispersed.

 The problem was that tactical action overshadowed strategic objectives.  Compare this to Quid2, which is a natural disaster.  The best systems in the world have not been able to perform quickly and efficiently.  Reconstructing the entire logistics chain in two months was [difficult]. We were completely confident without paying attention to our logistical commitment, because we were assured that alternatives would be offered.  But until the last day, August 7, he was looking for an alternative to the contracts.

 

 General Carter: Before we talk about the enemy, do you think that as the Commander-in-Chief of the Armed Forces, you have enough power and ability to bring about change?

 President Ghani: No, because the security sector had some features that were not under my consideration.

 First, did the police chief in Kandahar appoint me or was it imposed on me?  Are all regional forces, local police and civilian insurgents and others created by local influential people or not?  Who fell first?  They.  There are so many considerations and arguments that a warlord strategy was possible?  But, it was the warlords who fell.

 

 General Carter: We can get back to that point.  Because when looking at the general situation as a whole, this point is important.  I just wanted to summarize the events of August, and think about what Afghans want to hear from you.  The first thing I know and you know is that the US Congress, I think, recently asked John Sopko, the US Special Inspector General for Afghanistan, to investigate some of the allegations against you.  The allegation that when you left home you took a certain amount of money with you, I think you probably want to respond to it.  The next question that more Afghans want to hear, though explained, would be really hard for you to leave the country in such circumstances after 5 years of commitment to Afghans?

 

 PRESIDENT GHANI: Of course it was a very difficult decision. In the last 100 days, I have been writing, I was alone, I thought there would be no more difficult thing.  I was forced to sacrifice myself to save Kabul and expose the violent coup, it was a coup and the people were not taken into consideration at all.

 Second, I want to make it clear that I did not withdraw any money from the country.  After reaching the first target, all the helicopters were handed over for search.  Not only do I welcome Mr. Sopko's investigation, but as I have previously suggested with the sound of this claim that I want the matter to be investigated by the United Nations or any other investigative body, you have known me for years, do you still?  Have I made any personal requests for a visa, or any other work?  If I wanted to earn money, when I left the Ministry of Finance, I could set up a contracting company or a for-profit company.  I have never worked in any country, including the United States, in my life.  Unlike other leaders, I have not received any money from the United States, NATO or any other country.  All the political elites of Afghanistan used to get money from the NDS operational budget, I have never taken any money from that agency.

 Apart from rights and privileges, I served as Minister of Finance and Rector of Kabul University.  During the presidency I gave my privilege to the First Lady's office, as there was no legal mechanism to fund her office.

 Everyone is familiar with my lifestyle.  What will I do with the money?  My point is that this is the fundamental question.  You know my basic needs are very simple.  I continue to receive pension money from the World Bank, which I do not feel the need to have an account abroad.  My wife's property is her inherited property in Lebanon, we have nothing else.  Just the same.  My son and daughter have an open and transparent life.  I did not have any partnership with any Afghan or foreign company.  It is an accusation made by Russia first.

 I am ready for any inquiry in this regard.  I am a distinguished person for my commitment to my country.  I have not come in contact with other intelligence organizations or in any other way.  I have made my own personality that I have created my own wealth.  When I came to Afghanistan, I sold my house in Batsada (a city in Maryland) to build a house in Kabul with that money.  However, I registered my fortune once in the year 1 when I became president and then in the year 9 I declared that I have five million dollars in cash.  This was my personal money, I intended to build a cultural center in my ancestral village with an agricultural research section.  I had no other intention.  Now that I have an asset that is my home in Kabul, you can still fully investigate it.  I have not transferred any money outside Afghanistan, I have continuously transferred my assets from abroad to Afghanistan.

 

 

 General Carter: Thank you, Mr. President. For the sake of this transparency, I know it will be very helpful to many people who have questions about this.  Now we come to the part where we talk about the middle ground.  I don't know if there were any observations about it or not, are there any points that you feel might have been done differently and another result achieved?

 

 PRESIDENT GHANI: One year before the February 5 agreement, events must be understood.  It is interesting to note that in many cases, the dates are the same.  On February 8, 2013, I convened a conference in Kabul called the Kabul Process, offering peace to the Taliban.  Following this, an international conference was held in Tashkent in which the countries of the region endorsed the Kabul process.  Then a conference of scholars in Kabul called for a ceasefire and I declared a ceasefire in June of that year without delay.  It was the first comprehensive ceasefire in the country's history since the 1980s.  After that (still you were involved) there were discussions with them.  Scholars from Indonesia, Saudi Arabia and Afghanistan have called for an end to hostilities.  And in November, at an international conference convened by Afghan partners in Geneva, it was followed and reaffirmed.

 We had a really Afghan-led and Afghan-owned conference, my goal was to propose peace in the peace process which was endorsed nationally and internationally by the scholars of the Islamic world, the region and the international community.

 It is not as if the United States suddenly appeared on the scene and tried to mediate peace.  My suggestion was to have a special US ambassador or special envoy help us in Pakistan.  Ambassador Khalilzad was appointed to do this.  But another point that needs to be taken into account and that we are fully aware of is that President Trump announced the Afghanistan and South Asia Strategy in August of that year.  In that strategy, he stated his decision to withdraw from Afghanistan.  He called on the Afghan government to bring about measurable results-oriented reforms and called on Pakistan to stop harboring terrorists and so on.

 The people of Afghanistan were tired of war.  You know, from the point of view of our allies, especially our important partner, the United States, much attention has been paid to the war, which has been called endless.  But it does not matter that the victims of this endless war were Afghans.  The cost benefit changed.  The people wanted peace.  I also put pressure on the peace process.  The peace process was welcomed nationally, transparently and by the people.  The incident that took place on February 5 of that year, instead of a peace agreement, we had an exit agreement.  This is the first part.  When President Trump ...

 

 General Carter: Sorry, when you say exit agreement, your target is the United States?

 

 President Ghani: US Exit Process  At the time, the Taliban was one of the world's leading terrorist organizations.  This is a global indicator of terrorism.  The cost of Taliban terrorism was reduced by about 5 percent of Afghanistan's gross domestic product, then rose to 7.5 percent.  The agreement took the form of contradicting President Trump's statement;

 The second part is that two agreements were reached that day.  For the first time, two incidents took place in Kabul.  NATO Secretary-General Anders Fogh Rasmussen and US Secretary of Defense Asper came to Kabul first and issued a joint statement.  The declaration was worked on for months and parallel to the Doha Accords.

 

 General Carter: Sorry this joint statement was between them and Char?

 President Ghani: The cat was between the United States, NATO, the Afghan government and all allies.  My question was, do we need any new agreement to replace the Bilateral Security Agreement (BSA, Strategic Partnership Agreement, SPA, Status of Forces Agreement, SOFA, NATO)?  After observing, the people said no, all the agreements have been ratified and these issues will be included in the joint declaration, then I asked the Vice President Amrullah Saleh and his colleagues about the Doha Agreement  What is the ruling in case of contradiction? Ambassador Khalilzad said that the joint declaration was made because the declaration was made with a well-known government.

 General Carter: So I think you have to explain whether there is another agreement or a middle agreement.

 President Ghani: US Government and Taliban [Agreement]  The agreement was signed by Ambassador Khalilzad in the presence of Foreign Minister Pampo in Qatar on the afternoon of February 2.  "This is a conditional agreement," he said in Kabul. "I repeat, this is a conditional agreement. If the Taliban do not keep their promises, the United States will rescind its agreement with them."  .  "We will not allow the achievements of the last 20 years to be lost," Stoltenberg said.  NATO stands with Afghanistan and the Afghan people.  Now is the time to take steps towards real peace; but in our agreement with the Afghan government, it is clear to the Afghan people that the ceasefire and the political debate are tied to America's retreat, and the principle was that;  Not everything is agreed upon, nothing is agreed upon.

 But if you look at the Taliban-US agreement, it only states that a ceasefire between the two sides will be a topic of discussion.  Here, too, it is important to note that the Taliban, in the name of the Islamic Emirate of Afghanistan, is not recognized by the United States, but the Taliban's agreement with the United States does not even mention the Islamic Republic of Afghanistan.  He summed it up by saying that the Afghan side would negotiate with the Taliban, while the agreement with us specified that an all-inclusive delegation from the Islamic Republic of Afghanistan would negotiate with the Taliban.  Also, the agreement between the US and the Taliban, which treated the Taliban as a state, did not specify that they would issue visas and passports to terrorist organizations.  Another important issue that is really the main reason for the events of August is that we came to an agreement (this month was the subject of discussion) that the United States facilitates the release of prisoners between both the Taliban and the Islamic Republic.  The figures quoted verbatim are as follows:  In the Taliban agreement with the United States, the United States has unilaterally promised to release "Taliban prisoners" and this promise is valid until March 5.

 General Carter: You were not consulted?

 President Ghani: No, we rejected it, we definitely rejected it.  I have read the whole peace agreement, you know I am doing my job, it was not right before a ceasefire, it was also a comprehensive and permanent ceasefire in exchange for what Mr. Asper and NATO Secretary General  He also insisted, as we had a ceasefire in [1], no consultation with me.

 In addition, the United States has made a unilateral commitment to release the remaining Taliban prisoners within three months.  Unfortunately, the United States respects Afghanistan's sovereignty and does not interfere in its internal affairs.

 We were given a deadline to release them.  The number of detainees was initially in the hundreds, but then in the thousands.  Probably two of the biggest international drug traffickers.

 I was forced to call a Loya Jirga to release them [I cannot make such a big decision without consulting the nation].  There is also a letter from Secretary of State Pompeo assuring the people of Afghanistan directly:

 First, the United States will force the Taliban to reduce violence and engage in direct negotiations [with the Islamic Republic of Afghanistan].

 Second, the United States supports an independent, cohesive, and democratic Afghanistan that has peace both at home and with its neighbors.

 Pompeo contacted me and assured me that the prisoners were not your tool, but America's.  But none of these promises were fulfilled.  Looking back, the removal of the Islamic Republic of Afghanistan from that document [the Taliban-US agreement] was the main reason for the collapse in August.  The Taliban refused to negotiate with us and told us who you are.  He even said about the prisoners that it is a commitment of the United States to abide by it.

 It is thus important to understand that an Afghan-owned and Afghan-led process that had regional and international support has been dismantled.

 General Carter!  The process was kept so secret that even US National Security Adviser John Bolton was not given a copy of the agreement and was only given to read and withdrawn.  Bolton wrote this in his memoirs.  No document was shared with us and hundreds of comments were ignored.

 Clearly, the State Department's negotiating team is responsible for the process and the outcome, particularly the question of how State Department lawyers allowed the two very different agreements to be settled.  To be arranged.

 Our negotiating team remained very united and did not lose focus on its core values.  My commitment to the people was that there would be transparency in the peace process, because transparency is essential for the continuation of peace.  Finally, in January of that year, I sent a letter to President Trump telling him that if he intended to leave, we should discuss all issues.  I relied on the Bilateral Security Agreement (BSA) and the Strategic Partnership Agreement (SPA).  I also wrote a letter to Pompeo in April [1], explaining in detail that the peace process is chaotic and creates domestic disunity in Afghanistan.

 General Carter: Did you find the answer to those two letters?

 President Ghani: One answer was that the head of the CIA and the commander of the Central Command (CENTCOM) came.  They noted our concerns but did not respond.  As you know, the key issue here is that the US security apparatus believed that it was in the best interests of the United States to remain consistent [until peace was achieved].  Of course, they could not speak on behalf of their supreme commander and said that his (Trump's) views were changing every minute.  This neglected our security, because they were working on a tactical level.

 The second answer was clear, a global campaign was launched against me that Ghani is an obstacle to peace, all the headlines in the international media as well as in the domestic media were against me.  Next I got the answer.  The other response was Secretary of State Pompeo's letter, in which he made clear his assurances to the Loya Jirga that the United States would stand by us in defending our values ​​and that we must accept the risk for peace.  We fully agreed on this point.  I was a big supporter of peace.  My election slogan and platform was peace, but it is my responsibility to believe and reassure them and I will take that responsibility seriously.

 General Cutter: I understand!  Other regional powers, such as Pakistan, played a key role.  You remember, in the second half of the year, you invited me to be a mediator between you and the Pakistani government.  What was your expectation of achieving what result?

 President Ghani: Common interests.  You may recall that I went to Pakistan and met General Raheel Sharif and others.  I even went to GHQ because of which I was criticized at home.  The reality is that the issue of Afghanistan is with the Pakistani military and intelligence because I approached them.

 We were the victims of an undeclared war.  I wanted to end that war.  I wanted a genuine partnership with Pakistan.  Looking back, one of the things we should all be aware of is the fact that General Musharraf, Pakistan's military ruler and leader, was speaking on 9/11.  The full text is available in CSPAN.  He expressed deep frustration and said that Pakistan was compelled to make a decision on its existence.  This is a test of Pakistan's survival and he has decided to stand by the United States despite not knowing what they want.  They considered such a threat from the United States to be a great insult to them and did not forget it.  Pakistan is controlled by a deep state and this deep state has an extraordinary tactical capability, which they demonstrated first during the Soviet invasion and then for the second time during the American war.  The United States has found no practical way to engage with Pakistan.  My hope was (that you also did your best because your relationship with Pakistan is different and you are being listened to) to convince Pakistan that building Afghanistan is in Pakistan's interest and not at a loss.  We can do a lot at the regional level, and in return our only demand was our sovereignty on our own soil, recognizing that Pakistan is a key element for our sovereignty.  The only issue I did not discuss with Pakistan was the Durand Line issue, and also because it was not within my authority (only Afghans on both sides of the line could decide), Afghanistan needed a strong and stable state.  To be able to discuss this issue, except that all other issues were debatable in order to create a real state-to-state relationship.  Despite my and your efforts, unfortunately Pakistan has not changed and Pakistan is a major threat to the rule of law and cooperation and the independence of nations.

 Pakistan feels like a wounded man, they feel like cooperating in moments of crisis, but then forget.  The current situation is a great victory for Pakistan.  They have consistently won their game, the hand of Pakistani generals behind the Taliban is now as bright as the sun.  The Taliban could never have succeeded without shelter, without support, without medicine, without all the equipment and bombs that destroyed Afghanistan.

 And now Pakistan's ambassador to Kabul has the role of viceroy, as did Russia's ambassador during the Soviet invasion.  But it cannot continue.  The lesson from all this is that Pakistan is concerned about its population, geographical location, and nuclear weapons, and I think Pakistan, especially after Trump's five-year strategy for South Asia, really  The facility was concerned about the threat because Trump had made it clear that we would not allow Pakistan's nuclear facilities to fall into the hands of terrorists.  Without the subsequent diplomatic pressure, the verbal threat from Pakistan was useless and angered them, and to quell that anger Pakistan forced bloodshed in Afghanistan and then the US attitude changed and the only victims were Afghans.  ].  Another important issue was that no meeting of the United States National Security Council was convened to evaluate the February 7 agreement.  Only one meeting was held on this and that too very late.  That's why all the security officials I didn't talk to didn't really know if they had been deported or not.  They were waiting to see what would happen next.

 General Carter: Absolutely, what do you think about the future?  I mean, you and I are all concerned about the emergence of ISIS.  With the onset of winter and the onset of drought, we are all concerned about a humanitarian catastrophe in Afghanistan.  What do you think about it?

 President Ghani: Thank you, this is my main concern and I am focused on it.

 The first issue is terrorism.  As President Obama said in his Nobel Peace Prize speech, the 9/11 tragedy was the work of a few young men who had deep hatred in their hearts and practiced an old tactic using new technology.  Terrorism is now an ecosystem.  Al Qaeda and ISIS may have declined as an organization.  But as an ecosystem, we really face a big threat.  Afghans have a fundamental question: Was the US agreement with the Taliban to outsource the war on terror to the Taliban and Pakistan?  Or was the goal to find a way out of Afghanistan?

 The Taliban claim to bring security, but the reality is that security came because the Taliban stopped fighting.  These were the people responsible for the bloodshed.  They have not brought any security, they have stopped their war, but on the other hand they have resorted to other forms of violence: killing of security and defense personnel, violence against women, forced marriages and so on.

 This is a very basic issue, some lessons are very important.  I wrote an article in the Financial Times Magazine on September 7, 2013 (The Folly of Quick Action).  2. The war on terror was declared and the army was given responsibility and the intelligence agencies were given wide powers.  The struggle for justice turned into a war of revenge.  The war took on a tactical rather than a strategic form and expanded day by day.

 The first major problem was that terrorism was defined as Islamic terrorism.  Terrorism has nothing to do with Islam.  Although followers of every religion have resorted to terrorist tactics in the last four years, their tactics have never been religiousized.  At one point, the problem was described as the problem of one billion Muslims, and the invasion of Iraq [the American war] was a major step in breaking the regional consensus.  We need regional consensus, we need the consensus of the Islamic world.  My first point is that Islam and terrorism must be separated.  Hatred against Islam will come at a high cost and lead to a resurgence of violence.

 Second, much of the focus should be on intelligence, policing, and economic and political operations to make the fight [terrorism] effective.

 Third, Europe and Asia must be at the forefront of this struggle, because they are under threat and their source.  Pakistan's problem must be solved.  A medium-term plan must be devised to help stabilize Pakistan, where conditions are bad and they have been affected by the extremism they have created. "

 

 General Carter: Going to the next thing, I know you guessed it. My question is, are you as concerned about the rise of ISIS inside Afghanistan as we are?  And I think you want to talk about human tragedy.

 

 President Ghani: "Of course I have this concern too.  For many years, I have been urging Western intelligence agencies to look at terrorism from an ecosystem and to develop a coordinated strategy to combat the phenomenon.  The phenomenon cannot be tackled tactically.  A combination of battlefields cannot form a combat strategy.  So this issue needs to be addressed.  ISIS is gaining strength as it uses the Taliban's weapons back on them.  ISIS is a student of the Taliban, and has been inspired by the Taliban.  Unfortunately an entire generation has learned nothing but violence and suicide.  For your information, I would say that suicide bombers would be sold in the market

 Unfortunately, the Taliban have not learned anything from the history of Afghanistan.  Seizure of power by force is always suppressed.  Taking away the right of Afghans to a comprehensive national peace has led to a new wave of violence.  Unfortunately, the international community (the Soviet Union and the United States) both insisted on using force in Afghanistan and thought that the use of force was the solution.  There must be a basic peace plan for Afghanistan. Now that the Taliban are in power, they must take responsibility.

 General Carter: Sorry, before we get into the humanitarian crisis, a lot of people are debating whether the current Taliban are different from the Taliban they were five years ago.  Do you think they understand that Afghanistan has changed in the last 5 years?

 

 President Ghani: Unfortunately the situation does not look good.  Before witnessing change, they must first understand what the price of their so-called success is.  They have not taken any responsibility.  Take for example the three incidents in Arghandab, their bloodshed and the level of fighting in Spin Boldak and other places.  There is no doubt that they too were victims of the violence that led to their birth.

 Second, they have resorted to absolute monopoly, without thinking that they do not have the skills to run everything.  The third and most disturbing statement by Mullah Hassan, in which he said that they were not responsible for the current humanitarian crisis, economic collapse and evacuation and migration of thousands of Afghans, was to flee the Taliban.  You turned.

 Why the chaos at Kabul airport?  Why did 1.2 Afghans leave?  If they had believed that the situation had changed, they would have stayed in Afghanistan.  The Taliban must respect Afghanistan's diversity.  They must acknowledge that Afghanistan has changed over the past five years, that they have the right to freedom of expression and that it is important that the West does not impose a group of warlords on Afghans. "

 

 General Carter: Do you think that if you stayed, they would be forced to understand?

 

 THE PRESIDENT: No.  Unfortunately, there was a lot of negative publicity after me, and we never had a chance to talk to them.  Khalilzad sat down with them.  The issue became completely American and Afghans were marginalized.  I am of the opinion that there is a possibility of a real debate now, because they do not enjoy the most fundamental element of governance, which is legitimacy.  The Taliban have no domestic or international legitimacy.  It is now up to the international community and the region to act in unison to give them legitimacy.  In the peace process they have gone in different directions, in terms of legitimacy they should not do so.  Because I believed, General Carter, that there was no military solution to the Afghan problem.  For this reason, despite the escalation of the war, we were finally trying to reach a political settlement.  The Taliban and their allies, the ISI, believed that the solution was war, and devoted all their energy to the war.  They acted in a comprehensive and methodical manner to escalate the violence and war. They were not committed to any political compromise.

 

 "My question was, what is your advice to the international community on how to deal with the Taliban? Your view is that they need legitimacy," Carter said.

 

 President Ghani: There must be an agenda that focuses on peace, hope, legitimacy, opportunity and belonging.  Legitimacy is the most basic issue, but we must realize that it cannot be achieved overnight.  We must continue this five-dimensional process simultaneously.  Hope comes first.  Afghanistan has a population of 1.2 million.  As of March 7, about 5% of the population is starving.  The economy has collapsed, not because politicians and technicians have left the country, but because they have destroyed existing structures.  I delivered food to the people at the last minute, and I should have done so because I was responsible to the Afghan people.

 There are some important issues in international engagement with the Taliban that need to be addressed. ”First, the humanitarian crisis in Afghanistan is not in anyone's interest, especially in Europe and Asia.  This will lead to a big wave of migration.  Second, the problem is not limited to the 1.5 million people inside Afghanistan alone, but extends to 5 million. Pashtuns across the border are also Afghans and have a shared history with their compatriots on this side of the line, as well as 5 million diaspora and refugee Afghans.  Included, this issue needs urgent attention.

 There are two solutions:

 The first is to work with the people, and the Taliban government must facilitate this assistance to find a solution to the problem. "  May God protect us from this drought.  Work on agricultural stability is essential. ”The urban population is facing a severe crisis because it has no job and no source of income.  For this solution I can suggest dozens of solutions.

 The second issue is the interest of the people of the region.  We had already controlled the effects of the quill.  But the fourth and fifth waves of the quaid are a global problem.  There are issues that have regional implications, such as migration, criminal gangs, drug trafficking, etc. In other words, an agenda should be set up to discuss with the Taliban what they can do about it.  I would like to point out the difference between one part being a humanitarian crisis and the other part being developmental, therefore relying solely on UN agencies is a waste of time.

 There are many resources in Afghanistan that need coordination.  I can have a specific discussion in this section.  If people have hope, problems can be solved.  Opportunity belongs to unpaid groups.  Neither the civil servants nor the security sector are paid, especially women, who have no income and are facing severe hunger.  How can this difference be noticed?  Because the subject here must be conditional.

 Legitimacy cannot be achieved without peace.  My suggestion to the international community is to avoid choosing who is the winner and who is the loser. Let a process go.  The Loya Jirga is a very effective national process.  There must be some time-limited conditions for a few years.

 

 General Carter: Please explain the Loya Jirga to our audience?  How is it organized and what can be the result?

 

 President Ghani: The Loya Jirga is one of our oldest institutions and it is the common heritage of all ethnic and linguistic groups in Afghanistan.  The word jirga has Turkish and Dari roots and is a large Pashto word with a big meaning.  The body has recently become more democratic, as members are elected by the same people who represent them.  I am proud to have convened the last two Loya Jirgas, which were attended by representatives from all walks of life and had a significant presence of women and youth.  Discusses and comments on topics.  The Loya Jirga is held in a consultative manner and includes the representation of the entire nation.  The same institution formed the transitional government in the year 1 and approved the constitution in the year 1.

 On what basis do the Taliban govern?  Who is responsible for whom?  Afghans must reach an agreement.  If an ethnic or linguistic group or any region is excluded from this process, it is itself an invitation to a proxy war.  The Taliban must realize that repeating the mistakes of the Communists and the Mujahideen will not leave them alone.  They are going the same way.  Depriving anyone, relying on force and killing does not work.  Afghans want services, they want opportunities, and they are an important part of that process.  A real understanding requires discussion.  If they have problems with certain individuals, they should not be part of the process.  Let's come to an agreement that for so many years some people will not stand for election and will not be politically active.  We must give priority to the nation over individuals.

 Also, there must be an account of corruption.  Everyone should be investigated for working in the Afghan government from now on.  Even all international accounts need to be clear on how much has been paid to whom.  Accounts should also be taken for the use of gold. Why should some people be given 5,000 acres of land in one signature?  If they want to go beyond that, the decision must be made by the Loya Jirga.  We must conclude that the definition of security is not just a cessation of hostilities, human security and interaction must exist.

 No one has the right to make any Afghan feel alienated.  This land belongs to all of us.  Women and men.  Speakers of all languages.  You know, we have eight languages, four of which are big.  We must be given the opportunity to reach that conclusion.  The international community must learn from its mistakes and not interfere in the process but support it.

 In terms of regional public works, I have to say that a lot of projects are underway, General Carter.  The TAPI pipeline should now have reached Herat.  Other such projects as railways, power and energy transmission lines and water projects.  ۲۶ Medium water dams were under construction to solve the drought problem.

 According to the World Wide Web, 5 million Afghans have electronic IDs, especially those based in Kabul.  Electronic IDs and the reforms we have brought to the Ministry of Finance and Da Afghanistan Bank can enable money to be sent directly to the people.  There are ways to solve the existing humanitarian crisis that are cheap and reduce the economic hardships of the people.

 Feeling we have 'Run out of gas' emotionally.  Islam is the greatest tool of our unity, how we interpret Islam should be left to us.

 My conclusion is about the market, business is more effective than foreign aid.  One dollar of exports equals one to two dollars of aid.  Assistance has not been effective but has provided tactical benefits.  With the exception of the UK, which relied on contractors and focused on small accounts rather than large processes, this had to change.  The region must recognize Afghanistan's problems. "

 

 General Carter: Of course, you and I have been in contact for a long time.  You have been silent for a very long time, 5 days thinking about what happened, your relationship with the government and Afghanistan, do you have any regrets?  How do you feel?  We want to know what happens to you in light of your commitment.

 

 President Ghani: My whole life's work was destroyed.  All my values ​​were trampled underfoot and I was blamed for everything.  I returned to Afghanistan while I was well aware of my death.  I lost 2% of my stomach to cancer that year.  I have no desire other than to serve my land and my people.  I have spent my entire life studying the history of Afghanistan and the region, thinking that I had developed a vision that could solve our fundamental problem.  The United States and our Western allies had a choice, either to change the nature of their fight against terrorism or to withdraw.  But we cannot have full national independence as long as the war on terror continues.  Because for our soil, every thought of ours was a victim of this war.

 

 General Carter: Yes, I know you personally and I am aware of your commitment.  You said in public that you would stand up to death, that as president you would be held accountable.  What is your answer to that?

 

 President Ghani: "Of course, their anger is understandable.  They have the right to hold me accountable, especially my trust in our international partners and never criticize them [like the president before me].  You know that I put all the pressure on myself to stop the current result.  People have a right to know that the continued imposition of foreigners on me has limited my opportunities and power.  We faced resistance and disagreement over security sector reform and the creation of opportunities.  For now, my request to my Afghan brothers and sisters is to consider whether this is beyond our reach, whether it is possible to have a war on one side and a fundamental reform on the other.  Based on that, we have won the war.  The republic had lost political support.  Our international partners have affected our regional ties.  All our neighbors wanted America to leave Afghanistan.

 I hope that the understanding will increase with the passage of time, but the anger of the people is perfectly understandable because I myself am as angry and annoyed as my people.  The reason I am still focused is because I want to pursue a path for the future that will lead us to settlement. I have no personal agenda but I want to help Afghanistan move in the right direction.  There is also a lesson for the international community.

 A neutral Afghanistan will be more beneficial to all than an Afghanistan that is a battleground for foreigners.  Only a neutral Afghanistan can force the region and the international community to come and help honestly.  Now we are not in the headlines, and most of the time we will not be remembered by the world.  I brought this to the attention of the people at Karate Karate.

 Is there anything we can do?  Of course you can.  On average I work 6 to 8 hours a day.  As President, I have only twice spent two hours in Bamyan province.  But if we had known that troop withdrawals would be a major issue, and my letter of year 1 had been answered in the affirmative, the outcome would have been different. "But we were assured that peace would be with us.  Unfortunately, this is not always the case.  But it is also part of the world order.

 Our biggest problem was that we thought the international community was tolerant of us.  The lesson here is that we have found a way to lead us to national reconciliation and independence and to create accountability so that we can all live together, together again.

 

 General Carter: Thank you very much, Mr. President.  There are many lessons in this dialogue.  Thank you so much for interviewing me. We all want a better future for Afghanistan.  I think your advice on dealing with the Taliban is helpful. ”Thank you very much for staying with us this morning.

 

 President Ghani: Thank you, General Carter. First, thank the BBC.